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WE’RE ON A MISSION FROM GOD:
PROPERLY INTERPRETING RLUIPA’S
“EQUAL TERMS” PROVISION
DANIEL MAZZELLA†
INTRODUCTION
About twenty-seven miles south of Chicago in Chicago
Heights, in a dusty, rundown warehouse, with clutter all about, a
small congregation settled in for Mass and began to pray.1 “Our
Father who art in heaven, Hallowed be thy name; Thy kingdom
come . . . ”2 But should such Kingdom ever come, it would find
itself subject to myriad zoning regulations, which could put an
end to the Kingdom before it even broke ground.3 That, at least,
has been the experience of many of those assemblies and
institutions awaiting the Kingdom’s arrival, including the River
of Life Church meeting in that warehouse.
The congregation of about thirty regular parishioners
dreamed of having a real church instead of their current dingy
warehouse.4 After some search, the church found a building in
the village of Hazel Crest, a few miles south of Chicago Heights,

†
Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2012, St. John’s University
School of Law; B.B.A., Accounting, 2008, Adelphi University; Certified Public
Accountant (C.P.A.). The author would like to thank Professor Marc O. DeGirolami
for his help in parsing an especially dense area of law, and the author’s mother, who
put up with being the test subject as he tried to find a way to make this subject
understandable and readable.
1
See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 368
(7th Cir. 2010).
2
Matthew 6:9–10 (The Holy Bible Catholic Edition RSV).
3
One can imagine an absurd situation in which God himself is denied a building
permit by a planning board especially zealous about maintaining its zoning plan.
However, the commencement of God’s Kingdom on Earth is likely to lead to a
significant revision of current law that may obviate such bothers.
4
River of Life, 611 F.3d at 368.
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and purchased it.5 Their prayers appearing answered, they
applied to the town for the necessary permits to operate a
church.6
Meanwhile, the Village of Hazel Crest, grappling with a
depressed downtown and declining tax revenues, had passed a
comprehensive revitalization plan.7 The plan called for the
creation of a pure commercial district around the train station in
the downtown area.8 From this area, all non-commercial land
uses, including religious land uses, were barred, with the goal of
creating a bustling commercial district that would generate
substantial tax revenues.9 The church’s property fell squarely
within this area.10
As the Village’s plan expressly disallowed religious land uses
in the zone, the congregation’s application was summarily
denied.11 Soon thereafter, the congregation filed suit in federal
court, invoking the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000,12 to reverse the village’s zoning decision.13
Thus, River of Life v. Village of Hazel Crest began, providing
another example of the tension that often exists between zoning
authorities and religious persons and organizations. Tensions
and emotions often run high where the local regulations restrict
the ability of religious organizations to site where they wish and
to worship as their religions dictate.14 The Bible says “[r]ender
5

See id.
River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, No. 08C0950, 2008
WL 4865568, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2008), aff’d, 611 F.3d 367 (7th Cir.2010).
7
See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 368.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
River of Life, 2008 WL 4865568, at *2.
11
See id.
12
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006).
13
See River of Life, 2008 WL 4865568, at *2.
14
For lurid accounts of such battles, see MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE
GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW, 78–110 (2005). However, the book has
been the subject of a good deal of controversy, including an intense back and forth
between professor Douglas Laycock and the author, as to the book’s factual accuracy
and the merits of policies advocated, with some claiming those policies to merely be
fronts for the author’s personal disillusionment with organized religion generally.
See generally Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169 (2007);
Marci A. Hamilton, A Response to Professor Laycock, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1189 (2007);
Douglas Laycock, God vs. The Gavel: A Brief Rejoinder, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1545
(2007); Marc O. DeGirolami, Recoiling from Religion, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 619
(2006).
6

FINAL_Mazzella (Do Not Delete)

2012]

WE’RE ON A MISSION FROM GOD

3/4/2013 11:47 AM

717

therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s,”15 but where
Caesar prevents religious organizations from functioning and
worshipping as they must, the implicit understanding of mutual
deference embodied in that Bible verse is violated. Additionally,
the First Amendment’s command against laws prohibiting the
free exercise of religion is often violated.16
Beginning in 1993, in the wake of Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,17 these
formerly local disputes became matters of federal import. Smith
held that the free exercise clause did not preclude the
enforcement of “generally applicable laws” on religious activities,
even where such laws burdened religious exercise.18 Smith’s
holding outraged religious and civil rights organizations alike,
who believed that the constitutional protections for religion had
been reduced to a dangerous minimum.19 Congress, likewise
outraged, sought to overturn Smith by statute.20
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000 (“RLUIPA”) is Congress’21 latest attempt to overturn
Smith.22 Congress’ prior attempt to do so with the Religious
15

Matthew 22:21.
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
See generally Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
17
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
18
Id. at 878.
19
See HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 223–26.
20
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512–16 (1997) (“Congress enacted
RFRA in direct response to the Court’s decision in [Smith].”).
21
The reader may have noticed the omission of the “s” after the possessive
“Congress’.” There presently exists a split of authority as to this matter among the
many institutions concerned with the rules of the English language, such as the
Associated Press. See Debra Cassens Weiss, The Supreme Court is Split on
Apostrophes, ABA JOURNAL (Sept. 2, 2010, 9:45 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/the_supreme_court_is_split_on_apostrophes. However, the Supreme
Court has ruled, and rules every time it releases an opinion, that “Congress’ ” is
proper. See, e.g., City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511 (using “Congress’ ”exclusively).
Though arguably dicta, as no case has ever required the resolution of this issue, the
repeated use of “Congress’ ” in majority opinions is compelling. Furthermore, the
split on the Court, formerly five-to-four, has in recent months expanded to six-tothree. See id. at 541 (Scalia, J., concurring) (using “Congress’s” exclusively in his
concurrence); Weiss, supra. Thus, the author intends to follow the binding precedent
of the Supreme Court and will not append clearly unnecessary s’s to his “Congress’.”
22
See HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 95.
16

FINAL_Mazzella (Do Not Delete)

718

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

3/4/2013 11:47 AM

[Vol. 86:715

Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) had proven to be
unconstitutional,23 thus Congress, hoping to cure any
constitutional problems, wrote RLUIPA to be narrower in scope.
Unlike RFRA, RLUIPA sought only, in relevant part,24 to end
discrimination against religious organizations in land use
decisions.25 A key component of RLUIPA is the “equal terms”
provision which provides “[n]o government shall impose or
implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a
religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a
nonreligious assembly or institution.”26
Though phrased simply, the “equal terms” provision has
caused great interpretive problems. The statute, while “[having]
the ‘feel’ of an equal protection law,” lacks a similarly situated
comparator.27 The statute, therefore, leads one to wonder: equal
terms compared to what? The statute further fails to define
“assembly” and “institution,” thus raising the further question:
What is included in “assembly” and “institution”?
To date, three federal circuit courts of appeals have dealt
with facial challenges28 to zoning ordinances under the provision
and have developed three different tests for its application.29 The
23

See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
As the statute’s name suggests, there are two halves to the statute. The
“institutionalized persons” half, which is beyond the scope of this Note, concerns
issues of free exercise in the context of prisons and other institutions, and has been
the subject of Supreme Court litigation. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713–
14 (2005) (upholding the act as constitutional under the Establishment Clause).
25
See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1226 (11th
Cir. 2004).
26
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006).
27
Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1229.
28
In this context, the plaintiffs assert that the terms of challenged zoning
ordinance on their face violate “equal terms.” This is in contrast to an as-applied
challenge where the plaintiff makes no argument as to the ordinance’s terms, but
only to the specific instance of its application. This Note is concerned solely with
facial challenges.
29
Two other circuits, the Tenth and the Second, have also been presented with
the “equal terms” provision of RLUIPA, but under different circumstances. The
Tenth Circuit case, Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, was
an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the religious plaintiff’s as-applied challenge
to the zoning statute. 613 F.3d 1229, 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 978 (2011). The Second Circuit case, Third Church of Christ, Scientist, of New
York City v. City of New York, likewise concerned an as-applied challenge to the
zoning ordinance. See 626 F.3d 667, 668–69 (2d Cir. 2010). The Eleventh Circuit has
also dealt with as-applied “equal terms” challenges on two occasions. See Primera
Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County, 450 F.3d 1295,
24
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Eleventh Circuit, in Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of
Surfside,30 held that the statute’s language included all
assemblies, with assembly retaining its basic definition of “a
group gathered for a common purpose.”31 Thus, the court held
that if a broadly defined secular assembly is allowed in a zone, a
religious assembly must likewise be allowed, lest the statute be
violated.32 Upon finding a violation, the regulation must then
survive strict scrutiny: the government must proffer a compelling
state interest for the inequality and demonstrate that the means
adopted were the narrowest possible.33
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Third Circuit judicially
added a similarly situated requirement not otherwise found in
the statute’s text.34 In Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc.
v. City of Long Branch,35 the court stated that the religious
plaintiff must not be treated on less than equal terms than a
secular assembly similarly situated as to the challenged
regulation’s “regulatory purpose.”36 That is, the court looks for
“internal consistency” within the land use ordinance that all land
uses having similar effects upon the ordinance’s purpose are
treated in equal fashion.37 For example, a land use ordinance
seeking to increase tax revenues would have to prohibit not just
religious land uses but all other land uses tending to generate
negligible tax revenue to not run afoul of the “equal terms”
provision.38
Additionally, once a violation is found, the
municipality is held strictly liable for the violation.39

1302 (11th Cir. 2006); Konikov v. Orange County, Fla., 410 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th
Cir. 2005). This Note deals only with facial challenges to zoning ordinances under
the “equal terms” provision. As such, the as-applied challenges of these other cases
are beyond the scope of this Note.
30
366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004).
31
Id. at 1231.
32
See id.
33
Id. at 1232.
34
Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253,
264, 266–67 (3d Cir. 2007).
35
510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007).
36
Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
37
See id. at 272.
38
See infra Part II.D.
39
Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269.
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Finally, the Seventh Circuit also judicially added a similarly
situated requirement, but declined to follow the Third Circuit’s
lead.40 Believing the “regulatory purpose” to be far too subjective,
the Seventh Circuit instead held that the religious plaintiff must
be treated on less than equal terms than a secular assembly
similarly situated as to “accepted zoning criteria.”41 Thus, for
example, a theater and a church would be similar as to the
zoning criteria of “traffic” as both land-uses tend towards
concentrated comings and goings of persons, either at the end of
a show or at the end of a religious service.42 However, like the
Third Circuit, should a violation be found, the municipality is
held strictly liable.43
The three-way circuit split is by itself a problem begging for
resolution by the Supreme Court, but exacerbating the problem
is the potential for serious constitutional issues depending on the
interpretation adopted. As the Third and Seventh Circuits have
noted, the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation, and the statute
itself, taken to their natural extreme create an affirmative right
for religious organizations to avoid generally applicable
regulations.44 Given such liberal definitions, nearly anything is
either an assembly or an institution. Such a result goes beyond
Congress’ enforcement powers as defined in section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment.45 As the Court explained in City of
Boerne v. Flores, section five gives Congress the power to enact
remedial legislation to correct and prevent abuses, but does not
allow Congress the power to substantively alter or add rights.46
The Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation arguably commits that very
sin.47

40
River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 371
(7th Cir. 2010).
41
See id.
42
Id. at 373.
43
See id. at 373–74.
44
See id. at 371 (“If a church and a community center, though different in many
respects, do not differ with respect to any accepted zoning criterion, then an
ordinance that allows one and forbids the other denies equality and violates the
equal-terms provision.”); Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 268 & nn.12–13.
45
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
46
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518–19 (1997).
47
See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 371.
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On the other hand, while the Third and Seventh Circuits
avoid the constitutional problems of the Eleventh Circuit, it is an
open question as to whether their interpretations are
contravening Congress’ intent.48 The statute’s text, even without
resort to legislative history, makes clear that Congress intended
to give religious plaintiffs a new tool with which to advance their
interests.49 The interpretations of the Third and Seventh Circuit
make it significantly more difficult for religious plaintiffs to
maintain their claims, and may be entirely too friendly to
municipal defendants by structuring the inquiry solely in the
municipality’s terms—either the municipality’s “regulatory
purpose” or the “accepted zoning criteria” used by the
municipality.50
Additionally, the “similarly situated”
requirement added by both circuits is without basis in the text of
the statute.51
Thus, in an effort to avoid the evils of
unconstitutionality, these courts appear to have chosen to risk
the perceived lesser evil of contravening Congress’ intent.
This Note argues that the interpretations given to the “equal
terms” provision thus far are incorrect, and that a better
approach is to compare secular and religious assemblies and
institutions on the basis of their purposes. Part One of this Note
provides the background to RLUIPA from Sherbert to the Act’s
enactment. In Part Two, Midrash, Lighthouse, and River of Life
are presented in chronological order and each circuit’s test is
analyzed. In Part Three, the provision’s plain text and its
placement in the larger statutory scheme are analyzed in
accordance with standard canons of construction. The current
circuit approaches are then critiqued. Finally, a solution to the
current circuit split based on the proposed test of the Seventh
Circuit’s dissenter is presented, which provides the best balance
between effecting Congress’ intent and preserving the statute’s
constitutionality.

48

See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 287–88 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006) (providing four separate statutory provisions for
religious plaintiffs to base claims upon).
50
See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 385–86 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
51
See id. at 385 (“Tellingly, the Lighthouse Institute majority did not try to
make an argument for its interpretation from the text and structure of the statute.”).
49
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Solving the current circuit split and developing a solid test
has become more urgent in light of the recent economic
downturn.
As state and local governments come under
increasing stress from falling tax revenues, they will resort to
new and creative ways to raise funds, including changing zoning
schemes to favor tax producing land uses over tax exempt land
uses, of which religious land uses are prime exemplars. This
danger is made clear by the fact that in Midrash, Lighthouse,
and River of Life, the challenged zoning regulations were enacted
specifically to revitalize depressed or underdeveloped zones to
increase tax revenues.52
THE COMPELLING (BUT NEUTRAL) RECENT HISTORY OF THE
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

I.

Section A of this Part discusses the rise and fall of Sherbert
v. Verner,53 and its replacement by Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith54 as the key
case in free exercise jurisprudence. Also discussed is the case of
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah55 and
its impact on modern free exercise jurisprudence. Section B
deals with the initial congressional response to the Supreme
Court’s holding in Smith, and the Court’s disposition of the
resultant legislation in City of Boerne v. Flores.56 In Section C,
the genesis of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”),57 Congress’ second attempt to
work around Smith, is presented. The concluding Section, D,
provides a brief summary of where the law stood immediately
following RLUIPA’s passage.

52

See id. at 368; Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 258; Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of
Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1221–22 (11th Cir. 2004).
53
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
54
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
55
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
56
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
57
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006).
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The Fall of Sherbert and the Rise of Smith

Sherbert v. Verner, from its inception in 1963, was the key
case in free exercise jurisprudence.58 The rule announced was
that government regulations that substantially burden a person’s
free exercise of religion are subject to strict scrutiny.59 That is,
the government would have to show that the challenged
regulation served a compelling state interest, and demonstrate
that the means adopted are the narrowest possible, inflicting the
smallest burden possible.60
In Sherbert, the plaintiff, a Seventh Day Adventist,61 was
denied unemployment benefits by the South Carolina
Employment Security Commission following her refusal to work
on Saturdays, her Sabbath day.62 Though the commission was
empowered to make individualized exceptions for good cause, the
commission held that religious conviction was not good cause.63
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated that this denial
amounted to penalizing plaintiff for practicing her religion,
thereby substantially burdening her right to free exercise.64 The
Court further held that South Carolina’s interest in preserving
the financial solidity of the state unemployment fund was not a

58
See 1 KENT GREENAWALT,
AND FAIRNESS 236 (2009).
59

RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE

See id.
See id.
61
Though differences exist, in the main Seventh Day Adventists follow
the traditional beliefs of conservative Christianity. See The Seventh
Day Adventist Church: Its Beliefs and Practices, RELIGIOUSTOLERANCE.ORG,
http://www.religioustolerance.org/sda2.htm (last updated Nov. 10, 2009). The most
obvious difference is the Adventist practice of observing the Sabbath on Saturday
instead of Sunday—the practice at issue in Sherbert. See id. Doctrinally, a key
difference is the rejection of the notion of “innate immortality.” See id. Far from
believing that each person is immortal by way of the soul as commonly believed by
most other Christian denominations, Adventists believe that upon death a person
enters an unconscious state only to be “reawakened” on judgment day, at which
point the person will either be granted eternal life or be permanently destroyed. See
id. Also integral is the belief in Christ’s imminent return and the attendant
occurrence of a Rapture event. See id.
62
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399–401 (1963).
63
Id. at 400–01.
64
Id. at 404.
60
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compelling interest sufficient to justify the substantial burden
imposed.65
Thus, the employment commission could not
constitutionally deny plaintiff unemployment benefits.66
Over the next two decades, the Court would periodically
revisit Sherbert and extend its logic to new areas. One such case
was Wisconsin v. Yoder,67 decided in 1972. There, a Wisconsin
statute required all children to attend school until the age of
sixteen; the parents of the child to be held criminally liable
should the child not so attend.68 A group of Amish parents,
pursuant to their Mennonite beliefs, refused to allow their
children to attend compulsory education beyond the eighth
grade.69 The parents of the children were convicted and fined for
violating the statute.70 A unanimous Court71 held that, as in
Sherbert, the challenged regulation effectively prevented the
faithful from exercising their religion by penalizing them with
criminal sanction for following those beliefs.72
However, in 1988,73 as if to foreshadow what was to come,
the Supreme Court expressly declined to either extend or apply
the Sherbert rule in deciding Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass’n.74
The federal Forest Service intended to
construct a seventy-five mile paved road connecting two
65

See id. 406–08.
Id. at 410.
67
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
68
Id. at 207–08 & n.2.
69
Id. at 207–08.
70
Id. at 208.
71
Justices Rehnquist and Powell took no part in the consideration of this case.
See id. at 236. Justice Douglas filed a partial dissent. He concurred in the result as
to the Yoders, but would have remanded the case of the others for further
proceedings to determine the wishes of the children. See id. at 243–46 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). The decision, he explained, was more complex than simply balancing the
state’s interest in compulsory education against the parent’s right to raise and rear
his child. See id. at 241. Rather, the child is a distinct and vitally important third
party whose preference and decision, provided the child is mature enough, may be
dispositive in this context. See id. at 242. He emphasized that education in the
modern world is so vitally important that any decision as to its continuation or
cessation can easily determine the entire path of the child’s life and foreclose or
make available to him or her innumerable opportunities. Therefore, the child’s voice
ought to be heard. See id. at 244–46.
72
See id. at 218 (majority opinion).
73
Also decided in 1988 was Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith
(Smith I), 485 U.S. 660 (1988), the lesser known and less controversial first iteration
of the landmark case.
74
485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988).
66
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California towns.75 Work had been completed on either side of
the seventy-five mile span such that all that remained to be
completed was a six-mile span through the Chimney Rock
national forest to connect the two halves of the road.76 Several
local Native American tribes objected to the proposed
construction of the road through the area alleging that the road
would result in irreparable harm to their centuries-old religious
practices in the area.77 The endangered practices required
complete immersion in nature with no man-made interference.78
The road, they argued, would make such immersion impossible.79
In rejecting their claim, Justice O’Connor wrote that the
Free Exercise clause does not require the bending of government
action to every religious practice.80 If the free exercise clause
required such a result, it would become very difficult for the
government to craft and implement any of its policies.81 Indeed,
as the Court emphasized, in this case the Federal government
owned the land outright and was exercising its right to build
thereupon.82 Furthermore, the petitioner’s position, if adopted,
would “require de facto beneficial ownership of some rather
spacious tracts of public property” for these tribes and would
effectively federally subsidize their religious beliefs, something
implicating potential Establishment Clause issues.83
Where Lyng had merely declined to extend Sherbert,
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith,84 decided in 1990, affirmatively cut back the
reach of Sherbert so far as to effectively render it largely
toothless.85 The Oregon state ordinance in question required the
denial of unemployment benefits if the applicant had been
dismissed for “misconduct,” which often included illicit drug

75

Id. at 442.
Id.
77
Id. at 451.
78
Id. at 453.
79
Id. at 451.
80
See id.
81
Id. at 452.
82
Id. at 453.
83
Id.
84
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
85
See id. at 884 (“Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life
beyond the unemployment compensation field”).
76
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use.86 Should “misconduct” be found, benefits would be denied,
no exceptions.87 Plaintiffs, two Native Americans, were fired
from their jobs at a private drug rehabilitation organization after
ingesting peyote at a religious ceremony,88 and were
subsequently denied unemployment benefits under the Oregon
law.89 In a situation that bore a remarkable outward similarity
to the facts of Sherbert, the plaintiffs alleged that the law coerced
them from freely exercising their religion by penalizing them for
acting in accordance with their religion.90
The Court held the tenets of an individual’s religion are no
escape from the command of generally applicable laws.91 Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, stated, “[t]he government’s
ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially
harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of
public policy, ‘cannot depend on measuring the effects of a
governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual
development.’ ”92 The rule petitioners sought, he warned, “would
open the prospect of constitutionally required religious
exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable
kind.”93 Where in other areas, such as race, the application of
strict scrutiny produces equality, here its application would
create “a private right to ignore generally applicable laws—[a]
constitutional anomaly.”94
Sherbert and its progeny were distinguished in two ways.
First,
Sherbert
itself
was
distinguished
by
noting
that the employment insurance system there involved
86

Id. at 874–75.
Id. at 874–76.
88
“[A] hallucinogen derived from the plant Lophophora williamsii Lemaire.” Id.
at 874.
89
Id.
90
See id. at 875–76.
91
Id. at 885.
92
Id. (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451
(1988)).
93
Id. at 888 (citing Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971)).
Interestingly, the district court decision of Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
Hialeah is cited by the Court in this part of the opinion, apparently approving of the
district court’s decision to enforce “animal cruelty laws” against the church plaintiff.
Id. at 889 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F.
Supp. 1467, 1476 (S.D. Fla.1989)). Within three years, this seeming approval turned
to unanimous disapproval. See infra notes 105–13 and accompanying text.
94
Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 886.
87
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“individualized . . . assessment[s].”95 That system “lent itself
to [the] individualized government[] assessment of the reasons
for the relevant conduct.”96
Consequently, a government
could not deny unemployment benefits in cases of religious
hardship without a compelling reason for doing so.97 The law in
Sherbert, therefore, was not “generally applicable.” Furthermore,
the Court stated that the Sherbert test had never been
successfully applied in any context other than the narrow
category of unemployment insurance programs involving
By
contrast,
the
“individualized . . . assessment[s].”98
Washington state law challenged in Smith was neutral and
generally applicable: The statute was a categorical denial of
benefits upon violation, with no individualized assessment of the
motivating reasons for the relevant conduct.99
Second, cases such as Yoder coupled other fundamental
rights claims with the free exercise claim.100 For example, in
Yoder, the Court explained that the free exercise claim was
intertwined with the fundamental right of parents to direct the
education of their children as understood in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters.101 Therefore, the progeny of Sherbert that ostensibly
extended its reach did anything but. Rather, the progeny of

95

Id. at 884.
Id.
97
Id.
98
See id.
99
See id.
100
See id. at 882 n.1.
101
Id. (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268
U.S. 510, 532 (1925)). Pierce concerned an Oregon statute that required school age
children to attend a state run public school in lieu of any other private school. See
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530–31. Should the child not attend a public school, the parents
would be guilty of a misdemeanor. Id. at 530. The law effectively made private
schools largely non-viable. Id. at 532. A Roman Catholic school and a secular school
challenged the statute. See id. at 531–33. The Court unanimously held:
[The law] interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control. . . . The
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children
by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is
not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.
Id. at 534–35.
96
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Sherbert were decided on non-free exercise grounds.102
Consequently, the claim in Smith being unconnected to any other
asserted right, could not stand on Sherbert alone.103
Many feared the rule announced in Smith had removed
many of the protections enjoyed by religion and would lead to
wide scale governmental interference with religion under the
guise of “generally applicable” laws.104 However, in 1993, the
Court at least partially countered those fears by striking down an
allegedly neutral law of general applicability in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.105 The city of
Hialeah, Florida, upon hearing that practitioners of the Santeria
religion106 intended to establish a church within the city limits,
convened several meetings of the town council.107 At these
meetings, the council passed several new ordinances prohibiting
the slaughter of animals for purposes other than food
consumption on the pretexts of preventing cruelty against
animals and protecting public health and safety.108
The
ordinances, however, were structured in such a way that no
person or organization other than a Santeria church could be
affected.109
102

Employment Division, 494 U.S. at 881–82.
See id. at 882.
104
See HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 225–26. See also Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2) (2006) (“laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may
burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious
exercise.”).
105
508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993).
106
Santeria, a fusion of traditional West African religions and Catholicism,
developed in the Caribbean, principally on the island of Cuba. See id. at 524. Central
to the religion is the belief in Orishas: powerful spirits who aid the faithful in
achieving their destinies. Id. The Orishas are not, however, immortal and require
periodic ritualistic animal sacrifice to survive. Id. at 525. Animal sacrifice, thus, is
crucial to the exercise of the Santeria faith. Common sacrificial animals include
various birds (particularly chickens), goats, sheep and turtles. Id. Historically,
practitioners of Santeria faced widespread persecution, and, as a consequence,
largely practiced in secret. Id. To this day Santeria remains secretive and is seldom
practiced openly. Id.
107
Id. at 526.
108
Id. at 527–28, 544.
109
For example, one ordinance outlawed the sacrifice of animals in any private
or public ritual for purposes other than food consumption. Id. at 527. A second
ordinance then restricted the application of the first ordinance to groups that
slaughter or sacrifice animals for any purpose as part of a ritual. Id. The net effect of
this formulation was to outlaw Santeria animal sacrifice while providing an escape
for other slaughterers of animals. In particular, under this formulation, kosher
103
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The Supreme Court held that while the ordinances on their
face were neutral and generally applicable, the statutes actually
had the suppression of Santeria as their object.110
The
ordinances had effectively been gerrymandered in such a way as
to ensure only Santeria would be adversely impacted.111 Thus,
the law was neither neutral nor generally applicable, and
therefore subject to strict scrutiny.112 The proffered government
interests of preventing cruelty to animals and protecting the
public health were neither sufficient to sustain these ordinances,
nor were they credible in light of the gerrymandered nature of
the ordinances that made the ordinances both under and over
inclusive.113 Hence, the Court held that where a law, albeit
outwardly generally applicable and neutral, operates to affect
religion specifically to the exclusion of other functionally
equivalent activities that produce similar effects, the free
exercise clause is offended and the challenged law must undergo
strict scrutiny.114

animal slaughter for food consumption was exempted, despite being pursuant to a
ritual. Id. at 536. Kosher slaughter was further exempted from the ordinances’
incorporation by reference of other exemptions under state law, one of which was an
express exemption for kosher slaughter. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
110
Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 534.
111
Id. at 536.
112
Id. at 546.
113
Id. at 545.
114
Id. at 545–46. There are essentially two variants of this holding, neither of
which carried a majority of the Court. The first variant found in Justice Kennedy’s
opinion searches for, and emphasizes the finding of an impermissible motive for the
challenged ordinances to render them non-neutral and subject to strict scrutiny. See
id. at 540. The second variant proposed by Justice Scalia in his concurrence would
ignore the underlying motive of the challenged ordinance and look solely to the
ordinance’s effects to determine both neutrality and general applicability. Id. at 558–
59 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Had the Hialeah City Council set out resolutely to
suppress the practices of Santeria, but ineptly adopted ordinances that failed to do
so, I do not see how those laws could be said to ‘prohibi[t] the free exercise’ of
religion.”). The most reasonable assumption is that both variations are valid, and
either the finding of an impermissible motive or gerrymandered effects would result
in strict scrutiny for the challenged law. In the general case, the two conditions are
almost certain to accompany each other. However, in the rare case where an evil
motive is present without accompanying negative effects—that is, Justice Scalia’s
inept municipality—one must wonder what plaintiff would have an injury under the
ordinance conferring standing to sue in the first place.
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Congress Gets Religion

Notwithstanding its decision in Lukumi, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Smith caused great bipartisan concern that
the constitutional protections afforded to religious exercise by
Sherbert had been destroyed.115 Congress was concerned that a
neutral and generally applicable law could burden religious
exercise just as surely as a law targeting religion.116 Thus,
Congress believed, the test most sensible and workable was the
Sherbert test applied by the Federal courts over the prior four
decades117—ignoring the Court’s assertion in Smith that the
Sherbert test had never been very active.118
To restore the pre-Smith balance, Congress enacted the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”) with
unanimous bipartisan support.119 The Act operated to restore
the Sherbert compelling interest test in all spheres to address
asserted
widespread
discrimination
against
religion.120
Furthermore, Congress, using its enforcement powers pursuant
to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, applied the RFRA
to all governments—federal, state, and local.121
However, Congress’ attempt to reverse Smith was rebuffed
by the Court four short years later in City of Boerne v. Flores.122
Bishop Flores of Boerne, Texas invoked the statute in an effort to
expand his growing church.123 He asserted that local landmark
ordinances impermissibly burdened his, and his congregation’s,
free exercise rights by preventing an expansion of the church.124

115

See HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 225–26.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2) (2006)
(“laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws
intended to interfere with religious exercise”).
117
Id. § 2000bb(a)(5).
118
See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883
(1990).
119
See HAMILTON supra at note 14, 225.
120
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515–16 (1997).
121
Id.
122
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
123
See id. at 512.
124
Id.
116
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Far from backing down in the face of unanimous congressional
action, the Court declared the statute’s application to state and
local governments unconstitutional and reaffirmed Smith.125
First, the Court stated that the power granted unto Congress
by section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, far from being
substantive or plenary, is remedial.126 That is, Congress has the
power to correct and prevent constitutional violations by the
states and enforce those violated constitutional rights by
appropriate legislation.127 Congress does not, however, have the
power to decree or alter substantive rights and then enforce such
rights by appropriate legislation.128 Rather, Congress’ power is
circumscribed by the text of the Constitution and the
interpretation thereof by the Supreme Court.129 The Court, not
Congress, has “[t]he power to interpret the Constitution in a case
or controversy.”130 Were it any other way, the Court continued,
“Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth
Amendment’s meaning,” thereby causing the Constitution to
become an ordinary law, changeable by ordinary means.131
The Court held that for a law to be a valid use of Congress’
remedial section five powers, the law must be congruent and
proportional to the asserted evil.132
To be congruent and
proportional, the law “should be adapted to the mischief and
wrong which the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment was intended to
provide against.”133 Here, the congressional record, the Court
noted, was devoid of any examples of active religious
discrimination within the last forty years.134 Thus, enactment of
a law so broad and powerful was out of all proportion and
congruence considering the lack of evidence of actual serious,

125
See id. at 536. Though unconstitutional as applied to the states, RFRA
remains wholly constitutional and applicable against the federal government. See
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439
(2006).
126
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
127
See id.
128
See id.
129
See id. at 524.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 529.
132
Id. at 520.
133
Id. at 532 (quoting United States v. Stanley (The Civil Rights Cases), 109
U.S. 3, 13 (1883)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134
Id. at 530.
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widespread mischief.135 The means adopted, moreover, had the
effect of rendering void vast numbers of otherwise valid generally
applicable and neutral laws—laws the Court had held in Smith
were perfectly valid.136 Hence, the Act had exceeded Congress’
section five powers, and was therefore inapplicable to the
states.137
C.

Congress Tries Again

Congress, having received the Court’s admonition138 in
Boerne, prepared for the next round in this First Amendment
ping-pong match. The lessons Congress learned from Boerne
were that (1) a record of widespread discrimination must be
established before a remedial statute can stand, and (2) the
statute must be written more narrowly.139
Senators Orrin Hatch of Utah and Edward Kennedy
of Massachusetts led extensive senatorial hearings on
land-use discrimination against religious organizations.140 The
congressional record compiled contained extensive testimony
attesting
to
discrimination,
numerous
anecdotes
of
discrimination, and numerous statistical analyses evincing
discrimination.141 Senators Hatch and Kennedy, on the basis of
135

See id. at 531–32. However, the Court noted that even with a substantial
record, RFRA could not “be considered remedial, preventive legislation, if those
terms are to have any meaning. RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial
or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to
prevent, unconstitutional behavior.” Id. at 532.
136
Id. at 534–35.
137
Id. at 536. Justice Stevens in his concurrence would have invalidated the
statute as a violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). He
wrote that the legal weapon given to religious organizations by the statute was
governmental preference for religion as opposed to irreligion, thus constituting an
establishment of religion in general. See id. at 537 (“[T]he statute has provided the
Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain. This
governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the
[Establishment Clause of the First Amendment].”).
138
“Admonition, n. Gentle reproof, as with a meat-axe. Friendly warning.”
AMBROSE BIERCE, THE UNABRIDGED DEVIL’S DICTIONARY 12 (David E. Schultz &
S.T. Joshi eds., 2000).
139
See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530–532.
140
See 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
141
Id. at S7775 (“[T]he hearing record reveals a widespread pattern of
discrimination against churches as compared to secular places of assembly, and of
discrimination against small and unfamiliar denominations as compared to larger
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the evidence gathered, noted that discrimination often “lurks
behind such vague and universally applicable reasons as traffic,
aesthetics, or ‘not consistent with the city’s land use plan.’ ”142
Therefore, the senators concluded, “discrimination against
religious [land] uses is a nationwide problem” demanding a
federal solution.143
Congress’ solution was the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), sponsored by
Senators Hatch and Kennedy.144 The Act passed easily, enjoying
broad bipartisan support.145 The purpose of the Act was to
restore, to the extent permissible, the pre-Smith balance in the
areas of land use regulation and institutionalized persons—that
is, prisoners.146 The scope was remarkably less than RFRA’s had
been.
The “equal terms” provision is one of the protections
provided for free exercise by the statute, stating that “[n]o
government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a
manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less
than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.”147
The congressional record includes statements indicating that the
provisions of the statute were in large part codifications of
existing free exercise jurisprudence, such as Smith and Lukumi,
to, Congress hoped, avoid a repeat of Boerne.148 In the land use
half of the statute, section (a) appears to be a codification of
Sherbert as defined by Smith.149 Section (b)’s provisions appear

and more familiar ones. This factual record is itself sufficient to support prophylactic
rules . . . .”).
142
Id. at S7774.
143
Id. at S7775.
144
See id. at S7774.
145
See HAMILTON supra note 14, at 96 (“President Clinton went on to say:
‘[Senators Hatch and Kennedy’s] work in passing this legislation once again
demonstrates that people of all political bents and faiths can work together for a
common purpose that benefits all Americans.’ ”).
146
See 146 CONG. REC. S7778 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
147
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006).
148
“Each subsection closely tracks the legal standards in one or more Supreme
Court opinions, codifying those standards for greater visibility and easier
enforceability.” 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000). The record
specifically cites to both Smith and Lukumi shortly after this statement. Id. at
S7775–76.
149
See infra Part III.A.
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to be a codification of the Smith-Lukumi line of cases.150 How
well and to what extent the statute’s terms adopt these
precedents has, however, been heavily argued.
D. Conclusion—State of the Law on the Eve of RLUIPA
Sherbert today is severely restricted and is no longer the
default rule. Rather, the default rule is now that of Smith, which
allows for some burdening of religious exercise provided that
such burdens are due to neutral laws of general applicability.151
However, should a law be found to be non-neutral and not
generally applicable, as was the case in Lukumi, strict scrutiny
may still apply. Furthermore, the inquiry into neutrality and
general applicability is not limited to the terms of the challenged
statute. Rather, neutrality may be violated if the effects of the
statute are applied in a gerrymandered fashion or with a
discriminatory motive.
Congress may act to protect free exercise, but must do so in a
fashion that operates within the bounds defined by the Supreme
Court. RLUIPA, the latest congressional attempt to protect free
exercise, attempts to do so by adopting many of the Supreme
Court’s precedents as its rules. To date, the Supreme Court has
not reviewed the land use portion of RLUIPA to determine
whether Congress did so properly. Other courts have, however,
and this Note’s focus now turns there.
II. CIRCUIT BREAKER—THE THREE INTERPRETATIONS OF
“EQUAL TERMS”
To date, three circuit courts of appeals have dealt with
RLUIPA’s “equal terms” provision in highly similar contexts and
have each come to very different conclusions as to its application.
In this Part, each circuit’s approach will be presented and
analyzed in chronological order. Therefore, Section A concerns
the Eleventh Circuit’s handling of Midrash Sephardi in 2004;
Section B concerns the Third Circuit’s treatment of Lighthouse in
2007; and, lastly, Section C concerns the Seventh Circuit’s
150

See infra Part III.A.
However, following Smith at least twelve states had by 2006 passed statutes
similar to the federal RFRA. See HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 109. In these states,
the Sherbert rule may, depending on the precise formulation, still apply generally.
See id.
151
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disposition of River of Life in 2010. In Section D, a simple fact
pattern will be presented and each circuit’s approach applied to it
to illustrate in concrete terms the application of each test.
A.

The Eleventh Circuit—Midrash Sephardi

Confronted with a situation where the local zoning scheme
excluded religious assemblies while allowing secular assemblies,
the Eleventh Circuit held the “equal terms” provision violated.152
The town of Surfside, Florida was a small municipality of
approximately one square mile. Nonetheless, the town had
contrived to divide itself into eight separate zones.153 The town’s
zoning plan stated that any land use not specifically permitted in
a zone was prohibited in that zone.154 Religious land uses—in the
words of the statute, “churches and synagogues”155—were
prohibited in all but one zone, and even there required a
“conditional use permit” granted at the town’s discretion.156 The
area along the main road through town had been zoned as a
commercial district.157 In this zone retail shopping, personal
services, theaters, restaurants, private clubs, social clubs, lodge
halls, dance studios, music instruction studios, modeling schools,
language schools, and schools of athletic instruction were
expressly allowed.158
Churches and synagogues were
prohibited.159 The town’s intention in doing so was to create a
bustling business center to bolster year round tax revenue160 and
improve the town’s economic position vis-à-vis its neighbors.161

152

Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1243 (11th Cir.

2004).
153

Id. at 1219.
Id.
155
Id.
156
See id.
157
See id. at 1219–20.
158
Id. at 1220.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 1219–1222. Surfside’s economy was otherwise dominated by tourism.
See id. at 1219 (“[Surfside] has approximately 4,300 residents and an additional
estimated tourist population of 2,030.”).
161
Id. at 1221–22.
154
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Midrash Sephardi and Young Israel of Bal Harbour were two
small Jewish congregations that chose to share rented space on
the second floor of a building located in the commercial district.162
The town denied Midrash’s applications for permits to operate as
a synagogue in their rented space.163 Midrash never appealed
these denials.164 Young Israel never applied for any permits or
variances.165 The two congregations joined to file an “equal
terms” claim against the town, asserting that they had been
treated on less than equal terms as compared to a non-religious
assembly.166 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Surfside. 167 The congregations appealed.168
The Eleventh Circuit first noted that the “equal terms”
provision had the “ ‘feel’ of an equal protection law”169 but lacked
any explicit similarly situated requirement.170
The court,
therefore, concluded that the relevant consideration was whether
land uses within the statute’s “natural perimeter”171 were treated
on “equal terms.” From the terms of the statute, the court
determined the “natural perimeter” for comparison provided by
the statute was all assemblies and institutions.172
However, the statute failed to define what qualifies as either
an assembly or an institution.173 In the absence of any statutory
definition, the court defaulted to the plain meaning of the terms
as found in the dictionary.174 Thus, assembly was defined as “a
company of persons collected together in one place [usually] and
162
Id. at 1220. Young Israel had been leasing space in the Coronado Hotel in
Surfside’s tourist district, but the building had been sold out from under them
forcing them to join with Midrash temporarily. See id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
See id. at 1220–21.
166
Id. at 1223, 1228–29.
167
Id. at 1223.
168
Id. at 1222–23.
169
Id. at 1229.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 1230. The “natural perimeter” language is derived from Justice
Harlan’s concurrence in Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York. See 397 U.S. 664, 696
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“In any particular case the critical question is
whether the circumference of legislation encircles a class so broad that it can be
fairly concluded that religious institutions could be thought to fall within the natural
perimeter.”).
172
Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1230.
173
Id.
174
Id.
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usually for some common purpose (as deliberation and
legislation, worship, or social entertainment),”175 or, more simply,
“a group gathered for a common purpose.”176 An institution was
likewise given its basic dictionary definition of “an established
society or corporation: an establishment or foundation esp. of a
public character.”177
Midrash and Young Israel were clearly assemblies under the
definition chosen. Thus, the question became whether the
congregations were treated on less than “equal terms” versus
secular assemblies.178 The court focused the ordinance’s explicit
allowance of “private clubs” in the zone.179 “Private clubs” were
likewise adjudged to be assemblies within the natural perimeter
of the statute.180 Thus, the conclusion became obvious: By
allowing a secular assembly such as a private club to site in the
zone, while precluding a religious assembly such as Midrash and
Young Israel from doing so, the ordinances treated the
assemblies on different terms in violation of the statute.181
The court then turned to the issue of what standard to apply.
Holding the “equal terms” provision to be the codification of the
Smith-Lukumi line of cases, the court concluded that the same
rules should apply in the case of an “equal terms” violation.182
Thus, the challenged statute would be subject to strict scrutiny:
Surfside must therefore adduce a compelling state interest for
the inequality and prove the means adopted to be the least
restrictive possible.183 The court then invalidated the ordinances
on the basis that the ordinances were not narrowly tailored,
being simultaneously overinclusive and underinclusive.184
Surfside, however, challenged the constitutionality of the
statute on several bases.185 Relevant here is only Surfside’s
attack on the statute as being beyond Congress’ section five
175

Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S 3D NEW INT’L UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 131 (1993))
Id. at 1231 (court’s rephrasing of the definition).
177
Id. at 1230 (quoting WEBSTER’S 3D NEW INT’L UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1171
(1993)).
178
See id. at 1231.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 1232.
183
See id.
184
Id. at 1234–35.
185
Id. at 1235–36.
176
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powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.186 The court found
these contentions to be without merit.187 First, the court noted
that Congress had, unlike in RFRA, compiled a significant record
of discrimination and had expressly stated in the legislative
history its intention to codify existing Supreme Court
precedent.188 Second, the court noted that Congress enacted the
statute as a remedial measure to correct the discrimination noted
in the congressional record, permitting a broad interpretation.189
Furthermore, because of the record of discrimination established,
the statute could not be said to be either out of proportion or
incongruent to the problem asserted.190 Hence, RLUIPA was
upheld as constitutional.191
B.

The Third Circuit—Lighthouse

Presented with a comprehensive redevelopment plan seeking
to create a culturally “vibrant” and “vital” downtown commercial
district, the Third Circuit held that religious land uses could be
excluded provided other land uses having similar effects on the
plan’s “regulatory goals” were likewise excluded.192 Accordingly,
the Third Circuit did not find the redevelopment plan violated
the “equal terms” provision.193
The Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism was a religious
organization that sought to “minister to the poor and
disadvantaged in downtown Long Branch, New Jersey.”194 To
better serve the poor and disadvantaged, Lighthouse purchased a
building in downtown Long Branch, a depressed neighborhood

186

See id. at 1236. Surfside also challenged the statute as a violation of the
Establishment Clause, relying on Justice Stevens’ concurrence in Boerne, and as a
violation of the Tenth Amendment. Id. Both challenges were unsuccessful, and are
beyond the scope of this Note. See id.
187
Id. at 1239–40.
188
Id. at 1231–32, 1236, 1239–40.
189
See id. at 1239.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 1239–40.
192
Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253,
272 (3d Cir. 2007).
193
Id.
194
Id. at 256.
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with a large population living below the poverty line.195
Lighthouse proceeded to apply for the appropriate permits from
the city.196
Long Branch had, however, enacted a comprehensive
redevelopment plan to revitalize the depressed downtown area in
which Lighthouse wished to site.197 Under the terms of the plan,
any land use not expressly allowed was prohibited as in
Midrash.198 Expressly allowed and encouraged were commercial
land uses such as restaurants, bars, theaters, cinemas, retail
dance studios, culinary schools, art workshops and studios, and
fashion design schools.199 Religious land uses, schools,200 and
government buildings were prohibited by dint of their
omission.201 The city’s stated purpose was to “[s]trengthen[]
retail trade and City revenues,” and to encourage a culturally
“vibrant” and “vital” downtown district with a well developed
retail sector.202
The city denied Lighthouse’s application to operate as a
church in the zone as the redevelopment plan prohibited such
uses.203 Thereafter, Lighthouse filed an “equal terms” claim,204
195

See id. at 278 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 279–80.
197
Id. at 258 (majority opinion).
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Specifically, elementary, middle and high schools were proscribed. Id.
Certain specialty schools, such as culinary schools, were specifically allowed. See id.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id. at 259.
204
The full procedural history is much more complicated than the abbreviated
facts recounted in the main text. Lighthouse purchased the building in dispute in
1994. Id. at 257. Despite initial support from local leaders, the project soon ran into
problems and Lighthouse’s permit applications were denied. Id. at 278–80 (Jordan,
J., dissenting). Between 1994 and 2001, Lighthouse applied for many permits and
variances seeking approval for a church and soup kitchen, all of which were denied.
Id. at 279–80. In 2001, Lighthouse filed for a preliminary injunction to compel Long
Branch to grant Lighthouse’s zoning permit. Id. at 280. The district court ruled for
Long Branch, and the Third Circuit affirmed. Id. During this first round of
litigation, Long Branch enacted the redevelopment plan. Id. at 280. Lighthouse
sought approval for a church under the new plan, but was again denied. Id. at 281–
82. In 2004, Lighthouse amended its complaint, adding RLUIPA and constitutional
claims against Long Branch as to both the Redevelopment Plan and the prior
ordinance. Id. at 282. In 2005, the district court granted summary judgment as to all
claims for Long Branch. Id. Discussed in the main text is the appeal from the 2005
district court decision.
196
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asserting less than equal treatment as compared to secular
assemblies allowed by the statute.205 Taking its lead from
Midrash, Lighthouse argued that where any secular assembly is
allowed under the zoning ordinance, a religious assembly must
also be allowed.206
The city argued that allowing religious land uses and schools
would utterly thwart the city’s purpose in enacting the
redevelopment plan.207 The city asserted that the omission of
religious land uses and schools was due to a New Jersey statute
that prohibited the granting of liquor licenses within a specified
distance of such land uses.208 A church, therefore, would create a
zone around itself wherein no restaurants, bars, or clubs could
site, thereby frustrating the city’s attempt to foster a culturally
“vibrant” and “vital” downtown.209
The court, siding with the city, rejected Lighthouse’s
invitation to adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s Midrash test.210 The
court stated that the rule adopted in Midrash was far too
expansive and was liable to exceed Congress’ powers under
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.211 The lack of a
similarly situated requirement in the Midrash test coupled with
the broad definition of “assembly” and “institution” created a
standard with no boundaries.212 According to the Third Circuit,
under the Midrash test
if a town allows a local, ten-member book club to meet in the
senior center, it must also permit a large church with a
thousand members—or, to take examples from the Free
Exercise caselaw, it must permit a religious assembly with
rituals involving sacrificial killings of animals or the

205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212

See id. at 259.
Id. at 267.
See id. at 270.
Id.
Id. at 270–71.
See id. at 268.
See id. at 267 n.11, 268 & nn.12–13.
See id. at 268 n.12.
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participation of wild bears213—to locate in the same
neighborhood regardless of the impact such a religious entity
might have on the envisioned character of the [neighborhood].214

The Third Circuit held such a test would create an
affirmative right on the part of religious organizations to ignore
zoning ordinances.215 Such a result, the court stated, ran counter
to both the text of the statute and the intent of Congress.216
The court held a religious plaintiff must show that it was
treated on less than “equal terms” as compared to a secular
assembly similarly situated as to the challenged regulation’s
“regulatory purpose.”217 In arriving at this conclusion, the court
began by looking at the legislative history behind RLUIPA.218
Relying upon statements by members and committees of the
House of Representatives and the Senate, the court concluded
that RLUIPA was a precise codification of the Smith-Lukumi line
of cases.219 Specifically, the “equal terms” provision codified
Lukumi. Lukumi and other Third Circuit precedents, the court
continued, required that the challenged regulation be analyzed
by the effects activities had upon the challenged statute’s
“regulatory purpose.”220

213
As fantastic as this reference may seem, the court is referring to Blackhawk
v. Pennsylvania, a Third Circuit precedent written by then Circuit Judge Samuel
Alito. 381 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2004). The Lakota Indians, of which plaintiff, though
Lenape by blood, was one by adoption, hold black bears to be protectors of the Earth,
essential to sanctify religious ceremonies and imbue worshippers with spiritual
strength. Id. at 204. Plaintiff purchased in 1994 two black bear cubs, named Timber
and Tundra, and began holding Lakota religious ceremonies on his property with
them. Id. Pennsylvania requires a permit to keep such animals, and, beginning in
1997, there began a dispute as to the permit necessary. See id. at 205. Plaintiff
claimed, on the basis of the Free Exercise clause, that he was exempt from needing
to obtain the more expensive permit Pennsylvania claimed he needed. See id. Also,
in 2000, the bears got loose and bit two people, resulting in the Pennsylvania Game
Commission seeking an order to destroy Timber and Tundra. See id. at 206. The
court accepted the Free Exercise claim, and separately prevented the destruction of
the bears. See id. at 206, 214, 216.
214
Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 268.
215
See id. at 269 n.14.
216
Id. at 268.
217
Id. at 266.
218
Id. at 263.
219
See id. at 264–65.
220
Id. at 264–67.
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Here, the court held schools and religious land uses were
similarly situated as to the regulatory purpose by reason of the
New Jersey statute limiting the availability of liquor licenses
near schools and churches.221 The two land uses had similar
effects upon the regulatory purpose as both, by operation of the
New Jersey statute, would create areas around themselves
wherein no restaurants, clubs, and bars could site, thereby
frustrating Long Branch’s purpose of creating a culturally “vital”
and “vibrant” downtown area.222
The redevelopment plan,
therefore, prohibited the two land uses that would have
detrimental effects upon the redevelopment plan’s goals.223
Consequently, there was no violation of the “equal terms”
provision.224 The court noted, however, that had a violation been
found, the city would have been strictly liable.225
C.

The Seventh Circuit—River of Life

The Seventh Circuit held that where a municipality sought
through the application of “accepted zoning criteri[a]” to create a
pure commercial district, there was no “equal terms” violation
when the religious and secular assemblies similarly situated as
to those “accepted zoning criteri[a]” were excluded.226
The village of Hazel Crest, Illinois, located some miles
outside of Chicago Heights, was a small town in the midst of
economic difficulties.227 Its downtown area by the railroad
station had been depressed for some time.228 In an effort to
revitalize the area, the village adopted a zoning plan that
endeavored to create a pure commercial zone in and around the

221

Id. at 272.
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id. The court did, however, find that the prior zoning ordinance did violate
the “equal terms” provision. See id. at 272–73. As the record did not disclose the
aims of the prior ordinance, and Long Branch failed to raise a triable issue of fact as
to whether the ordinance treated religious and non-religious assemblies on less than
“equal terms,” Lighthouse was entitled to summary judgment. Id. However, because
the ordinance had been superseded by the redevelopment plan, only monetary
damages, including attorney’s fees, were available to Lighthouse. Id. at 273.
225
Id. at 269.
226
River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 373–74
(7th Cir. 2010).
227
Id. at 368.
228
Id.
222
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train station, the logic being that the proximity to the station
would encourage traffic to bolster local business and tax
revenue.229 Additionally, the village offered tax incentives to
businesses that would site in the zone.230 As of July 2010, no
businesses had moved to take advantage of those tax
incentives.231
River of Life Kingdom Ministries was a small congregation of
about thirty regularly attending members that purchased an old
warehouse and office232 in the new commercial zone with the
intention of renovating it into a church.233 At the time of
purchase, River of Life was aware of the zoning plan, but went
ahead with the purchase on the basis of some faulty legal
advice—the faultiness of which was revealed when the church’s
permits to operate as a church were denied by the village.234
Thereafter, River of Life proceeded to file an “equal terms” claim
against Hazel Crest.235
The Seventh Circuit began by first surveying, and rejecting,
the approaches of its sister circuit courts. Judge Posner, writing
for the majority, rejected the Midrash test essentially for the

229
River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, No. 08 C 0950, 2008
WL 4865568, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2008), aff’d, 611 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2010).
230
See id.
231
See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 375 n.1 (Manion, J., concurring).
232
Id. at 368 (majority opinion). Between the various opinions in the River of
Life case there is some disagreement as to what the building in question was. The
district court recorded the building purchased as an “old warehouse and office.”
River of Life, 2008 WL 4865568 at *2. Judge Manion in his concurrence and Judge
Sykes in her dissent identify the building as an “abandoned car wash.” River of Life,
611 F.3d at 375 n.1 (Manion, J., concurring); id. at 377 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“The
property formerly housed a car wash . . . .”). The author investigated the matter
using Google’s Street View, and, based on the photographs, his personal experience
with his family’s car wash business, and his father’s more than forty year car wash
experience, has determined that the district court was almost certainly correct.
16842 Park Ave., Hazel Crest, Ill. 60429, GOOGLE, http://maps.google.com/
maps?q=16842+Park+Ave.,+Hazel+Crest,+Ill.+60429&hl=en&sll=40.733432,73.992452&sspn=0.074794,0.154324&hnear=16842+Park+Ave,+Hazel+Crest,+Cook,
+Illinois+60429&t=m&z=16 (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
233
River of Life, 2008 WL 4865568 at *2.
234
See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 378 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
235
Id. Hazel Crest was granted summary judgment in the district court, and had
this grant affirmed by a Seventh Circuit panel. Id. at 368 (majority opinion).
Subsequently, River of Life’s petition for a rehearing en banc was granted, resulting
in the opinion discussed in the main text. Id.
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same reasons as the Third Circuit.236 The court likewise rejected
the Lighthouse test as too friendly to municipalities, and for
entailing an inquiry into legislative history not likely to be
profitable.237
The court, however, agreed with the general thrust of the
Lighthouse test.238 That is, the court agreed as to the need for a
similarly situated requirement similar to a “regulatory purpose”
to limit the statute’s scope and the danger of an unbounded
interpretation, such as that of Midrash, exceeding Congress’
powers.239 The court reasoned that the key defect of the
Lighthouse test—the reliance upon a subjective standard—could
be solved by a shift from “regulatory purpose” to “accepted zoning
criteria.”240
“ ‘Purpose,’ ”
Judge
Posner
wrote,
“is . . . manipulable” whereas “ ‘[r]egulatory criteria’ are
objective—and it is federal judges who will apply the criteria to
resolve the issue.”241
The court then turned to what “accepted zoning criteria”
included.242 After providing a brief survey of the history of
cumulative and exclusive zoning, the court explained that these
criteria include such traditional Euclidean zoning considerations
as health, safety, and morals as well as concepts such as traffic
and tax revenue generation.243 Thus, for example, a theater and
a church would be similar as to “traffic” as both land uses tended
towards concentrated comings and goings of persons, either at
the end of a show or at the end of a religious service.244
236
See id. at 370. Furthermore, Judge Posner noted that the markedly more
favorable treatment of religious organizations over similar secular organizations
under the Eleventh Circuit’s test may raise Establishment Clause problems. Id. (“A
subtler objection to the test is that it may be too friendly to religious land uses,
unduly limiting municipal regulation and maybe even violating the First
Amendment’s prohibition against establishment of religion by discriminating in
favor of religious land uses.”). This statement appears to be based solely on Justice
Stevens’s concurrence in Boerne. See supra note 137; River of Life, 611 F.3d at 375–
76 (Manion, J., concurring). Whatever the validity of these concerns, they are beyond
the scope of this Note.
237
See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 371.
238
See id.
239
Id. at 370–71.
240
Id. at 371.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id. at 371–72.
244
Id. at 373.
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Applying the criteria here, the court concluded that Hazel
Crest truly had simply applied accepted zoning criteria in its
attempt to carve out a pure commercial district.245 The court
noted that the zoning ordinance specifically excluded other
assemblies and institutions similar to churches, in the abstract,
as to their tax generation and traffic potential.246 Thus, River of
Life had no reasonable hope of success, and the court affirmed
the grant of summary judgment to Hazel Crest.247
D. A Simple Fact Pattern To Illustrate Each Circuit’s
Approach248
The town of Rusty Wrench had fallen on hard times.
Located in the Rust Belt, the heavy industry that had once
formed the basis of the economy had been in decline for decades.
The recent economic downturn signaled the death knell for the
remaining industry in the town. The downtown area along the
river, formerly a picture perfect American downtown replete with
small Mom and Pop shops, had become run-down and was
characterized by numerous boarded up shop windows and a
decaying Woolworth’s department store.
City leaders seeking to reverse the downward spiral and
boost sagging tax revenues enacted a comprehensive
redevelopment plan for the downtown area. In the downtown
area, small boutique shops and restaurants were encouraged and
property tax incentives were offered to businesses that would site
there. Specifically allowed land uses included boutique shops,
small retail stores, restaurants, cafés, catering halls, professional
offices, and specialty schools such as dance, cooking, and art
schools. The town’s purpose was to create a “vital” and “vibrant”
downtown area with a strong retail sector that would attract new
investment and attract a new younger demographic.
Reverend Elmer Gantry was a traveling minister operating
in the tri-county area. He became renowned for his revival
meetings, and after many years of such revivals had finally,
245

Id. at 373–74.
Id. Land uses held to be similar to a religious land use, and likewise
prohibited in the zone included “community centers, schools, and art galleries.” Id.
at 368.
247
Id. at 373–74.
248
This fact pattern is the creation of the author and is not from any case.
246
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through tithes and donations, raised enough money to establish a
proper church. Familiar with Rusty Wrench, and appreciating
its central location in the area where his followers lived,
Reverend Gantry looked to the depressed downtown by the river.
Forming Riverside Revival Ministries, Inc., Reverend Gantry
purchased the abandoned Woolworth store in the downtown
zone. He promptly sought the appropriate permits to renovate
the building into a church. His applications were denied, and the
matter soon made it to federal court.
Supposing this occurred in the Eleventh Circuit, the first
question to be answered is whether the proposed religious use is
an assembly within the meaning of the “equal terms” provision.249
Clearly, Reverend Gantry’s church is a religious assembly within
the statute’s “natural perimeter.”
Next, the court would determine whether the challenged
ordinance allowed any other secular assembly to site within the
zone.250 Here, the court would likely hone in on the express
allowance of catering halls, though the inclusion of any assembly,
including restaurants and cafés, would work as well given the
terms of the analysis. Given a definition of an “assembly” as a
“group gathered for a common purpose,”251 a catering hall would
be adjudged to be an assembly within the “natural perimeter” of
the “equal terms” provision’s language.
Thus, as a secular assembly is expressly allowed while a
religious assembly is excluded, “equal terms” is violated. Thus,
the burden would shift to Rusty Wrench to adduce a compelling
state interest and to demonstrate that the means adopted were
the narrowest possible.252 The town’s interest in creating a
“vital” and “vibrant” downtown to increase tax revenues would
not rise to the level of being compelling. Therefore, Rusty
Wrench would be compelled to grant Reverend Gantry’s zoning
permit.

249

See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230 (11th
Cir. 2004).
250
See id.
251
Id. at 1231.
252
See id. at 1232.
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However, supposing Rusty Wrench was within the Third
Circuit’s jurisdiction, the first step would be to determine the
challenged ordinance’s “regulatory purpose.”253
Here, the
regulatory purpose is to create a “vital” and “vibrant” downtown
to increase tax revenues.
The next step is to determine whether the statute is
internally consistent in promoting that regulatory purpose.254 As
the ordinance excludes all non-commercial uses that, like
religious land uses, would not generate tax revenues, the court
would likely rule that as to the underlying purpose of increasing
tax revenues the ordinance is internally consistent. Therefore,
the town excluded just those land uses that would have a
detrimental effect upon the tax revenue generation purpose.
Consequently there would be no “equal terms” violation, and the
court would rule for Rusty Wrench against Reverend Gantry.
Finally, if Rusty Wrench was located within the Seventh
Circuit’s jurisdiction, the court would first determine the
“accepted zoning criteria” Rusty Wrench used in creating its
zoning plan.255 Here, the town clearly was crafting their zoning
scheme in such a way as to maximize tax revenues.
The court would next determine whether all land uses
similarly situated as to the zoning criteria used were treated on
“equal terms.”256 Here, the zoning ordinance created a pure
commercial zone seeking to maximize taxable revenue. Land
uses that do not produce property tax or sales tax revenues,
including religious land uses, were all excluded under the terms
of the statute, which allowed exclusively tax paying, profit
seeking enterprises such as restaurants, boutique shops,
professional offices and the like. Thus, the court would likely
hold that Rusty Wrench had simply applied accepted zoning
criteria and had treated all land uses equally on the basis of
those criteria, and therefore hold for Rusty Wrench against
Reverend Gantry.

253
See Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d
253, 270 (3d Cir. 2007).
254
See id. at 272.
255
See River of Life Kingdom Ministries, Inc. v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d
367, 373 (7th Cir. 2010).
256
See id. at 373–74.
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III. A RE-INTERPRETATION OF “EQUAL TERMS”
This Part is divided into three sections. The first Section
introduces the canons of statutory construction that should guide
and constrain the proper interpretation of the “equal terms”
provision. RLUIPA as a whole is also presented to put the “equal
terms” provision in its proper context as it relates to the rest of
the statute. The second Section critiques the current three
interpretations. Finally, Section three presents a proposed
solution to the current circuit split based on Judge Sykes’s
interpretation of the “equal terms” provision.
A.

Limiting Canons of Construction.

A basic canon of statutory construction is that a part of the
statute should not be interpreted in such a way as to render it or
other sections of the statute superfluous.257 In RLUIPA, the
“equal terms” provision does not stand alone as the sole
protection for religious land uses. Rather, the statute provides
three other specific protections.
First, subsection (a)(1) provides that “[n]o government shall
impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that
imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the
government” can demonstrate the regulation is in furtherance of
a compelling state interest and the means adopted are the least
restrictive possible.258
The application of this section is
conditioned on the fulfillment of one of three jurisdictional tests
outlined in subsection (a)(2) being fulfilled: (A) “the substantial
burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal
financial assistance,” (B) the substantial burden affects
interstate commerce, and (C) the substantial burden is imposed
pursuant to a system that makes “individualized assessments of
the proposed uses for the property involved.”259
Thus, section (a) taken as a whole operates to restore the
Sherbert test in those areas left open by the Court in Smith.260
That is, by the terms of the statute, Sherbert applies in situations

257
258
259
260

See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009).
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).
Id. § 2000cc(a)(2).
River of Life, 611 F.3d at 381 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
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involving individualized assessments,261 where the federal
government has effectively federalized an area via financial
support,262 and where a challenger to a regulation can make a
claim intertwined with another right or power contained in the
Constitution.263 Also significant is the self-contained nature of
section (a), which clearly indicates Congress’ intent to keep
section (a)’s jurisdictional tests and compelling interest standard
separate from the provisions in section (b).264
Second, subsection (b)(2) provides that “[n]o government
shall impose or implement a land use regulation that
discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of
religion or religious denomination.”265 Thus, a town could not, for
example, enact an ordinance that prevents a Santeria church
from operating, while allowing other religions to do so.266 This
provision is essentially a codification of Lukumi.267 Where a
statute has as its object the regulation or suppression of religious
exercise, the challenged ordinance is presumptively invalid.268
However, unlike Lukumi, this provision, through its lack of any
statement regarding the standard applied, operates as a strict
liability statute, thus giving the challenged government no
possible escape once a violation is found.269
Finally, subsection (b)(3) provides that a government may
not impose a land use regulation that either: (A) “totally excludes
religious assemblies from a jurisdiction,” or (B) “unreasonably
limits religious assemblies, institutions, or structures within a
jurisdiction.”270 The general rule derived is that a government
may not totally exclude religious land uses from its
261

Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
See 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
263
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
264
See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 370–71; Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v.
City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 269 (3d Cir. 2007).
265
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2).
266
See supra notes 105–14 and accompanying text.
267
See supra notes 106–15 and accompanying text.
268
See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 381–82 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
269
See id.
270
§ 2000cc(b)(3). This subsection, by including only assemblies in (A) while
including “assemblies, institutions, or structures” in (B), implies that there is a
substantive difference between the categories of assembles and institutions. Id. That
is, certain land uses are, presumably, institutions only. However, this distinction,
such as it may be, is beyond the scope of this Note.
262
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jurisdiction.271 Interestingly, however, part (B) of the subsection
implies that there are reasonable grounds for excluding religious
land uses from specific areas within a jurisdiction. Thus, so as
not to render (B) superfluous, there must be some circumstances
under which none of the statute’s provisions, properly
interpreted, have any vitality, thereby allowing a government to
zone freely even as against religious land uses under some
circumstances, provided such zoning does not result in total
exclusion from the jurisdiction.
A second canon of statutory construction is the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance. The doctrine allows courts to interpret
a statute in a narrower fashion to preserve its constitutionality
where there is cause to believe a broader reading suggested by
the statute’s plain terms may prove unconstitutional.272
However, this doctrine is subject to two requirements. First, the
broader reading must strongly suggest its unconstitutionality.273
Second, the narrower reading must be consonant with the
legislative intent underlying it.274 That is, the narrower reading
must still serve the legislative purpose and cannot be read to
frustrate that purpose.275
Here, the potential constitutional issue is that the “equal
terms” provision by its plain terms may exceed Congress’ section
five powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.276 Specifically,
the “equal terms” provision may define a new right of religious
assemblies and institutions to ignore neutral laws of general
applicability, rather than guaranteeing to them rights defined in
the Constitution and by the Supreme Court’s precedents.277
The statute itself does not provide a definition of assembly or
institution. Thus, if one were to, like the Eleventh Circuit, use a
standard dictionary definition, the scope of the statute would be

271

River of Life, 611 F.3d at 381–82 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
United States v. Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916) (“A statute must be
construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is
unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.”)
273
YULE KIM, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 21 (2008).
274
Id.
275
Id.
276
See Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d
253, 269 n.14 (3d Cir. 2007).
277
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 528–29 (1997).
272
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nearly any land use conceivable.278 For example, the Eleventh
Circuit’s definition of assembly is “ ‘a company of persons
collected together in one place [usually] and usually for some
common purpose (as deliberation and legislation, worship, or
social entertainment).’ ”279 Put more simply, an assembly is a
gathering of two or more persons for a common purpose.280 With
such a definition what is not an assembly? As there is no explicit
or implicit limiting principle, arguably a restaurant with a staff
and a regular stream of customers is an assembly.281 After all,
the patrons, waiters and kitchen staff would be two or more
persons gathered in one place for a common purpose. Ergo,
suppose a town enacted a zoning ordinance allowing only
restaurants in its “R-1” zone with no exceptions of any sort—a
truly neutral law—and a religious assembly purchased land
therein. The religious assembly could file, and succeed in, an
action invoking the “equal terms” provision to compel the town to
grant the religious assembly a permit to site there. The
underlying logic would be that if a secular assembly—here a
restaurant—is allowed by the zoning ordinance, the town must—
to treat religious and non-religious assemblies on “equal terms”—
allow a religious assembly. The provision’s terms bear this
result, with the consequence that the religious assembly has
exercised a private right to ignore a neutral law of general
applicability unquestionably constitutional as applied to other
land uses—a “constitutional anomaly.”282
B.

A Critique of the Current Interpretations

The problem in Midrash as decided by the Eleventh Circuit
is not its result, but rather its test, which commits two errors.
First, the application of strict scrutiny here is utterly without

278

See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269 n.14.
Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230 (11th Cir.
2004) (quoting WEBSTER’S 3D NEW INT’L UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 131 (1993)).
280
Id. at 1231.
281
In Lighthouse, plaintiff indirectly made this argument. Relying on the
Midrash test, plaintiff argued that Long Branch, having allowed a panoply of
“assemblies,” of which bars, clubs, and restaurants were prominent, had to allow
religious assemblies such as itself to site. See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 267–68.
282
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990).
279
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basis in the statute.283 The statute operates as a strict liability
statute.284 The design of the statute indicates that the compelling
interest test applies only to section (a) of the statute and does not
extend to section (b).285 Indeed, the amicus brief submitted by
the United States argued this very point,286 and the Third and
Seventh Circuits have both, correctly, held likewise.287
Second, the interpretation the court gave the statute may be
“too friendly” to religious interests as noted by the Seventh
Circuit.288 By using such broad definitions for “assembly” and
“institution,” the statute implicates far more than is necessary.289
One would be hard pressed to find a land use under such broad
definitions that would not qualify as either an “assembly” or
“institution.” Indeed, the overinclusiveness of the definitions
creates an affirmative right on the part of religious assemblies to
ignore laws of general applicability—a result expressly
disallowed in both Smith and Boerne.290
Where the Eleventh Circuit’s test swung too far in favor of
religious plaintiffs, the pendulum in the Third Circuit swung too
far in favor of municipalities. Though the Third Circuit correctly
held the statute to impose a strict liability standard, the court
made it all but impossible for a religious plaintiff to succeed in
proving an “equal terms” violation.291 That is, by defining the
inquiry entirely in terms of the municipality’s “intent” or
“regulatory purpose,” a municipality may always escape liability
provided the asserted purpose is properly tailored.292
Furthermore, using a subjective standard such as the
municipality’s “regulatory purpose” requires an inquiry into the
legislative history underlying the zoning regulation.293 Such an
inquiry “invites speculation concerning the reason behind
283

See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367,
370–71 (7th Cir. 2010); Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 268–69.
284
See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 268–69.
285
See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 382 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
286
See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1231 (11th
Cir. 2004).
287
See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 370–71; Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 268–69.
288
See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 370.
289
See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269 n.14.
290
See id.
291
See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 371.
292
See id.
293
See id.
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exclusion of churches; invites self-serving testimony by zoning
officials and hired expert witnesses; [and] facilitates zoning
classifications thinly disguised as neutral but actually
systematically unfavorable to churches . . . .”294
Moreover, the Third Circuit’s test makes the “equal terms”
provision the equivalent of a Free Exercise claim, rendering the
statute itself unnecessary.295 When one considers that when
strict scrutiny applies a statute is almost certain to fail, the
addition of strict liability by the statute seems to be an
immaterial addition.296 The court, therefore, by its interpretation
renders the statute superfluous—in direct violation of basic
canons of statutory construction.297
The Seventh Circuit adopted a test that is substantially
similar to that of the Third Circuit and suffers from many of the
same flaws. In her spirited dissent, Judge Sykes argued that,
(1) the majority’s new test turned the “equal terms” analysis on
its head, and (2) the “accepted regulatory criteria” analysis was
effectively the same as the Third Circuit’s “regulatory purpose” in
effect.298 The majority’s analysis proceeded by comparing River
of Life’s proposed church to those assemblies already excluded
under the ordinance.299 Judge Sykes argued that the correct
mode of analysis was a comparison of the proposed religious use
against other uses allowed by the ordinance.300 The “equal
terms” provision’s concern was that religious land uses were
being treated less well than allowed secular assemblies, not that
there be equivalence of disallowed uses.301
294

Id.
See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 288 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
296
As the Supreme Court in Boerne explained:
Requiring a State to demonstrate a compelling interest and show that it
has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving that interest is the
most demanding test known to constitutional law. If “compelling interest
really means what it says . . . , many laws will not meet the test. . . . [The
test] would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious
exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (quoting Emp’t Div., Dep’t of
Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
297
See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 288 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
298
River of Life, 611 F.3d at 386, 388 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
299
Id. at 373 (majority opinion).
300
Id. at 387–88 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
301
Id. at 388.
295
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Furthermore, Judge Sykes noted that “accepted zoning
criteria” was just as amorphous and manipulable by zoning
officials as “regulatory purpose.”302 Indeed, many “regulatory
purposes” could easily stand as “zoning criteria.”303 For example,
a municipality could have as its purpose the increase of tax
revenues, or apply zoning ordinance using tax generation
capacity as the criteria for allowing and disallowing land uses.304
In either case, the municipality would have an easy victory—the
inquiry having been decided on the municipality’s terms. Such a
result clearly runs contrary to Congress’ intent.305
C.

A Proposed Solution

Judge Sykes’s dissent in River of Life provides an excellent
starting point for a workable solution. The proper test, Judge
Sykes explained, is to assess whether religious and non-religious
assemblies with a similar “primary purpose” are treated on
“equal terms” as against each other.306 This approach, therefore,
adopts the basic definition of an assembly as “a group of persons
gathered together, usually for a particular purpose” and works
directly with the common purpose mentioned in the definition.307
The inquiry, thus, focuses on the individual land uses being
compared, preventing the municipality from setting the terms of
the inquiry. Instead, each party would have an equal chance to
litigate the equality of treatment between uses permitted.308
Should a violation be found, the municipality would be held
strictly liable.309 The test, therefore, by having the terms of the

302

Id. at 386.
Id.
304
See id. (“Routine ‘economic development’ and ‘tax-enhancement’ objectives—
which can be characterized as ‘regulatory purposes’ or ‘accepted zoning criteria’—
will immunize the exclusion of religious land uses from commercial, business, and
industrial districts because religious assemblies do not advance these objectives and
for-profit secular assemblies do.”).
305
See id. at 387, 389.
306
See id. at 391.
307
Id. at 389.
308
See id. at 390 (noting “hotels, motels, gymnasiums, health clubs, salons,
restaurants, and taverns” as well as “day-care centers” are harder to classify, thus
making their statuses as “assemblies” within the statute open to debate).
309
See id. at 370–71 (majority opinion); Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v.
City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 269 (3d Cir. 2007).
303
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inquiry set in this manner, would not be lopsided in favor of
municipalities as it is under the Third and Seventh Circuit
approaches, and Congress’ intent would be given effect.
The “primary purpose” of an assembly would be assessed by
looking at the use in the abstract—what is the usual primary
“common purpose” of the people assembling for this land use?310
Incidental purposes should be discarded to appropriately limit
the inquiry.311 Furthermore, these people assembling for a
common purpose must share “a degree of group affinity,
organization, and unity around a common purpose”312 to further
reasonably circumscribe the statute’s breadth.
Thus, a
restaurant would not be an assembly equivalent to a church as
the patrons of a restaurant have hardly any group identity; the
patrons are simply there because, presumably, they are hungry.
By contrast, parishioners to a church assemble because of their
religious identity and to engage in the practice of their religion
with others who likewise identify themselves with the religion.
The distinction is clear, reasonable, and workable.
Applying this test to the Rusty Wrench example of Part II.D
yields results similar to the Eleventh Circuit’s test, but does so
while appropriately limiting the inquiry. The first step in the
analysis would be to determine which land uses allowed by the
statute are assemblies within the statute.313 Under the basic
definition of a group of persons gathered together for a common
purpose, restaurants, catering halls and specialty schools are all
clear candidates in this context, despite the commercial nature of
each. The next step is to then judge which of the identified
assemblies implicate a sufficient “degree of group affinity,
organization, and unity around a common purpose.”314 Of the
three land uses identified, the specialty schools and catering hall
land uses would imply such a group identity around a common
purpose. First, in the case of the specialty schools, the students
are generally organized into classes under the leadership of a
310

See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 390 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
Doing otherwise would lead to absurd results where a hotel, the primary
purpose of which is providing temporary lodging, that offers meeting hall or
ballroom space for rent could be considered roughly equivalent assembly for
purposes of the statute. See id.
312
Id.
313
See id.
314
Id.
311
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teacher and are engaged in a common activity with the common
goal of education in a particular field. Second, in the case of the
catering hall, the persons gathering there generally do so in the
context of celebrations such as wedding receptions—often
following a religious wedding—where all invitees share a definite
group affinity and identity in relation to the celebration. Thus,
on these facts, the court would likely hold for Reverend Gantry
and against Rusty Wrench.
This interpretation has the added benefits of avoiding the
potential constitutional issue outlined above, effecting
congressional intent, and remaining true to the text and
structure of the statute as a whole. Returning to the restaurant
example discussed in Part III.A, the private right enjoyed there
by the religious organization challenging the zoning ordinance
allowing only restaurants in the zone would no longer exist.
Rather than simply looking for one-to-one equality of all possible
non-religious assemblies versus all religious assemblies, the
inquiry would be focused upon the allowed and allowable land
uses and their “primary purposes.” In such a case, the relevant
inquiry would be determining what the primary purpose of a
restaurant is, and whether that purpose is similar to that of a
church. Clearly, in such a case the “equal terms” provision would
not be violated. The primary purpose of people assembling at a
restaurant is to have a meal—the patrons do not identify with
the restaurant or each other to any great or lasting degree. A
church, as noted above, implicates much more: it implies a group
identity for those assembling and they assemble precisely for the
purpose of acting as a group in a common activity—religious
worship. Therefore, the absurd result creating a “constitutional
anomaly” noted earlier is addressed.
Likewise, Congress’ intent to provide religious organizations
a new tool with which to combat impermissible discrimination in
land use regulations would be fulfilled.315 The religious plaintiff
would be able to assert a claim with a reasonable chance of
success provided the organization could identify an assembly or
institution with a similar purpose allowed or allowable in the

315
See 146 CONG. REC. S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
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zone.316 Examples of such similarly purposed assemblies would
be those pursuing charitable or educational ends,317 essentially
running the gamut of non-profit and tax exempt uses. However,
the potential universe of similarly purposed assemblies would
not be restricted to those two areas. Rather, the inquiry would
be open to a case-by-case analysis of all the land uses allowed by
the statute implicated. The open ended nature of the inquiry
would allow nearly any religious plaintiff with a reasonable claim
to survive a summary judgment motion. Furthermore, as cases
are decided, the boundaries of the inquiry would become clearer
and more reliable, providing guidance to both zoning boards and
religious organizations, ultimately reducing discriminatory land
use regulations and the associated legal battles.
Finally, this interpretation hews closely to the text and fits
neatly within the overall statutory scheme unlike the current
circuit approaches. The inquiry looks to the plain meaning of the
words of the statute and gives them a meaning consonant with
the underlying congressional intent and terms of the statute as a
whole. Were one to adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s test, the “equal
terms” provision would be so powerful as to render subsections
(b)(2) and (3) superfluous, and to render section (a) significantly
less vital.318 Likewise, if one were to adopt either the Third or
Seventh Circuit’s test, the “equal terms” provision would be
rendered largely inoperative.319
This proposed test, by contrast, appropriately mimics the
Court’s Lukumi analysis by invalidating laws that, though
outwardly generally applicable, are either by their terms or
316
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the “equal terms” provision does not
confer immunity from zoning regulations. See id. at S7777. Indeed, were a
“megachurch” to attempt to use the “equal terms” provision to get ancillary uses
permitted—such as a bowling alley or a McDonald’s—under the umbrella of allowing
the basic religious land use of a church, the “equal terms” should not provide a
means to circumvent an otherwise valid land use ordinance except in extremely rare
circumstances. See HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 80 (noting the recent phenomenon
of the “megachurch” resembling “self-contained communities”). In such a
circumstance, the analysis would run into serious problems in the first leg of the
analysis as it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine the “primary
purpose” of the religious land use for comparison against that of secular assemblies.
317
After all, religious organizations do teach their followers the tenets of their
religion, and commonly operate Sunday schools and the like as an adjunct to regular
religious services.
318
See supra notes 257–72 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.B.
319
See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 387; see also supra Part III.B.

FINAL_Mazzella (Do Not Delete)

758

3/4/2013 11:47 AM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:715

effects discriminatory. With the “equal terms” as an objective
inquiry as to the terms and effects of the statute in question, the
province of (b)(2), dealing with either express or implied
discrimination “on the basis of religion,” would be left unaffected.
Thus, a religious organization would be able to challenge a land
use ordinance that, though generally applicable by design, was
enacted with an improper motive under (b)(2). Likewise, (b)(3)
would remain operable to prevent total exclusion from a
jurisdiction as the other subsections of (b) would not be so
powerful and far reaching to render such an exclusion
impossible. Finally, section (a) would remain operable to handle
situations involving laws that are not generally applicable and
make use of individualized assessments. Thus, each provision
would have a proper and distinct role to play with relatively little
overlap between each.
CONCLUSION
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000 (“RLUIPA”), the latest chapter in the battle between
Congress and the Court over the proper application of the Free
Exercise clause, seeks to prevent religious discrimination as
identified by Congress in an extensive record. By its simple
terms, the equal terms provision was well drafted to accomplish
just such a result. However, its simplicity of construction is such
that it has created tremendous problems of interpretation, and,
indeed, has lent itself to interpretations with a high probability
of being unconstitutional. But RLUIPA, and the equal terms
provision in particular, need not suffer the same fate as RFRA or
be rendered toothless. In Midrash, Lighthouse, and River of Life
each circuit was cognizant of the danger and, in the cases of the
Third and Seventh Circuit, took affirmative measures to avoid
the danger, albeit by contravening Congress’ intent. However, by
reference to the common purposes of the assemblies compared, a
reasonable middle ground is found that accomplishes Congress’
intent and does so in a fashion that does not offend the
Constitution.
Unfortunately, this sensible middle ground is not the law in
any jurisdiction. Rather, at present, there exist three separate
and distinct interpretations, each with myriad defects. The
situation demands addressing by either Congress or the Supreme
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Court to lay out, once and for all, the appropriate interpretation
for courts to apply. Again, given the recent economic downturn,
the need for such a settled interpretation has become more
pressing. As municipalities struggle for ways to boost sagging
tax revenues, they will engage in new and creative land use
legislation that favors tax generating land uses over tax-exempt
religious land uses such as churches. Thus, without a correct
interpretation for zoning boards and religious organizations to
rely upon, RLUIPA’s grand purpose to prevent religious
discrimination will be frustrated more often, and more seriously,
as time goes on.

